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ARGUMENT 
I. AN UNLAWFUL EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPROPRIATE WATER CAN INJURE OR 
ADVERSELY AFFECT OTHER WATER USERS' CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
WATER RIGHTS. 
The Defendants rest their entire defense of the summary judgment 
on one leg, and one leg only: the water rights of other users from the 
same water source cannot conceivably be harmed by any decision or 
proceeding of the State Engineer "under any scenario advanced," (Br. of 
Appellees at 21 n.5), including extension request proceedings. The 
Defendants assert this position no less than 38 times in a 43-page 
brief. Defendants summarily proclaim, "The statutes and policies of 
this State, which are based on the prior appropriation doctrine, 
demonstrate that the water rights of other persons are not at risk or 
adversely affected in an extension request proceeding." (Br. of 
Appellees at 15.) Defendants are wrong. They are wrong in theory. 
And they are particularly wrong under the facts of this case. If this 
Court were to follow Defendants' argument to its logical conclusion, 
the legislature could constitutionally dispense with even the minimal 
notice by newspaper publication of any State Engineer proceeding and 
deny water users the right to protest with constitutional impunity. 
A. This Court Must Assume That Mr. Longley's Water Rights Were 
Adversely Affected by the State Engineer's Unlawful Approval 
of Leucadia's Belated Fifth Extension Request. 
Upon review of a summary judgment, which "is generally considered 
a drastic remedy," Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993), 
the Court must view the facts in a light most favorable to finding a 
material issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment, Jackson v. 
Righter. 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995). Under this standard, this Court 
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must assume that Mr. Longley's water rights were, in fact, adversely 
affected by the extension approval. Mr. Longley repeatedly alleged 
that his water rights were adversely affected by the State Engineer's 
decision. (R. 159, 172.) Mr. Longley asserted in an affidavit 
attached to his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Leucadia's Motion 
for Summary Judgment that his property rights were adversely affected 
by being excluded from the subject proceeding. (R. 353.) Counsel for 
Mr. Longley again asserted at the hearing that Longley's water rights 
were adversely affected by being shut out of the extension proceeding.1 
None of the Defendants ever contested before the trial court that Mr. 
Longley's water rights were, in fact, adversely affected by his 
inability to participate in and oppose the untimely Fifth Extension 
Request and the State Engineer's subsequent unlawful approval of it. 
Therefore, this Court must assume, for purposes of summary judgment 
that Mr. Longley's water rights were, in fact, adversely affected by 
the unlawful extension approval. 
1
 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, you're the responding 
party and you say there are justiciable issues of fact. 
MR. SMITH: Well, more than that, Your Honor, there's 
important constitutional issues that they want you to brush aside 
and ignore. This is a property interest. We are going to be 
affected in a property interest if we're not allowed to be heard 
before the State Engineer. 
• • • 
[0]ur property interest is being affected and I can read you all 
the cases. (R. 564.) 
• • * 
I don't think there's anything that's a more valuable property in 
this state than water. Location is everything. How close their 
wells are to your wells, that's everything. And whether there's 
going to be interference with your property or not. (R. 565.) 
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B. Defendants are Wrong in Theory -- The Statutes and Policies 
of Utah Demonstrate That the Water Rights of Other Persons 
Are at Risk or Adversely Affected in an Extension Request 
Proceeding• 
The Defendants are forced to take the drastic position that no 
matter what the facts, Mr. Longley's property interests cannot be 
adversely affected by a decision of the State Engineer. Thus, to avoid 
a disputed issue of material fact, Defendants attempt to have this 
Court resolve, as a matter of law, the issue of whether a 
constitutional deprivation could have taken place by making the broad 
assertion that the water rights of users from the same water source 
cannot conceivably be harmed by any decision of the State Engineer 
"under any scenario advanced." (Br. of Appellees at 21 n.5.) However, 
adoption of Defendants' position by this Court would have disastrous 
consequences, drastically altering well-settled principles of 
constitutional law and water law. The statutes and court-adopted 
policies of this state, based on the prior appropriation doctrine, 
demonstrate that the water rights of other persons are at risk or may 
be adversely affected in an extension request proceeding. 
2. The legislature has recognized that the water rights of 
other persons are at risk or can be adversely affected 
in an extension request proceeding. 
Defendants' broad assertion that the water rights of other persons 
are not at risk or adversely affected in an extension request 
proceeding has superficial appeal but leaves a number of troubling and 
unanswered questions. First, if there truly is "zero risk" of 
deprivation in an extension request proceeding, (Br. of Appellees at 
18) , then why has the legislature required published notice of the 
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application and proceeding? Second, if notice by publication is truly 
designed only to solicit input from the general public, (Br. of 
Appellees at 26), then why is the scope of publication limited to the 
county in which the water source is located; shouldn't it be published 
basin-wide, or even state-wide, if notice by publication is a mere 
public input or public relations gesture? Third, if only the 
applicant's water rights are at risk of deprivation in an extension 
request proceeding, (Br. of Appellees at 13) , then why has the 
legislature given water users the right to protest an extension 
application? Fourth, if no other person's water rights are or can be 
adversely affected by an extension request proceeding, then why has the 
legislature explicitly recognized that extension request protestants 
can be "aggrieved by an order of the state engineer" and provided a 
process whereby extension request protestants "may obtain judicial 
review by following the procedures and requirements of [the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act]"? Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(1) (a) (1989) 
(emphasis added). (See also Br. of Appellee's Part I.) 
In light of the canons of statutory construction that any 
interpretation rendering parts of a statute superfluous be avoided, 
State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995), and that statutory 
provisions are presumed to have been used advisedly, Carlie v. Morgan, 
922 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1996), Defendants failed to answer these questions. 
First, the legislature requires published notice of the 
application and proceeding to satisfy the demands of due process. The 
core goal of due process is fairness. See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 
1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). But Defendants' argument that notice by 
publication is designed only to solicit public input, when taken to its 
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logical end, means that the State Engineer could dispense with such 
notice without offending that constitutional objective. If this Court 
follows Defendants' reasoning, the legislature could, with this Court's 
pre-approval, rewrite the state's water code to eliminate any notice 
requirements whatsoever. However, notice is not merely a "feel-good" 
public relations ploy but is the "minimum constitutional precondition 
to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property 
interests of any party. " Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 
791, 800 (1983) (emphasis added). The legislature infused the water 
code with notice requirements because it recognized that the State 
Engineer's decisions can adversely affect others' property interests. 
Second, notice by publication is not designed solely to solicit 
input from the "general public" because the scope of publication is 
limited to a newspaper in the county in which the water source is 
located and the right to protest an extension application is limited to 
water users. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (2) (g) (1997 Supp.). Not 
only has the legislature historically recognized that the water rights 
of other persons are at risk of being adversely affected by an 
extension request proceeding, it has most recently recognized that the 
water rights of other persons taking water from the same source of 
supply are the only rights at risk of being adversely affected.2 Non 
water users may not protest an extension application. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-3-12 (2) (g) (1997 Supp.). Accordingly, in order to inform this 
2
 Compare Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (2) (g) (1997 Supp.) (limiting 
the right to protest an extension to water users from the same water 
source) with Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (1) (f) (1989) (any person may 
protest the extension). 
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select group of water rights holders, notice of an extension request is 
required to be published only "in a newspaper of general circulation in 
the county in which the source of supply is located and where the water 
is to be used." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (2) (f) (I) (A) (1997 Supp.) 
(emphasis added).3 By giving only water users from the same water 
supply notice of and the right to protest an extension, the legislature 
has explicitly debunked Defendants' claims that the statutory notice 
requirements are merely designed to encourage input from the public. 
Third and fourth, the legislature has given water users the right 
to protest an extension application and appeal approval of the 
application as an "aggrieved party" because, as set forth below, 
extensions can adversely affect other water users from the same source 
of supply and, therefore, those water users have the right to be heard. 
The Utah legislature has explicitly recognized that extension request 
protestants can be "aggrieved by an order of the state engineer" and 
has provided a process whereby extension request protestants "may 
obtain judicial review by following the procedures and requirements of 
[the Utah Administrative Procedures Act]"? Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-
14(1)(a) (1989). Defendants concede this (Br. of Appellees at 10-11), 
but then argue that the water rights of other users from the same water 
source cannot conceivably be harmed by any decision of the State 
Engineer "under any scenario advanced," (Br. of Appellees at 21 n.5). 
3
 This was true under the pre-1997 version of the statute, as 
well. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(1) (e) (i) (1989) (emphasis added) 
("The state engineer shall publish notice once each week for three 
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in 
which the source of supply is located.'1) 
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Defendants' inconsistent position is that a person can be 
adversely affected or aggrieved by a decision of the State Engineer 
only if he files a timely protest and becomes a party, (Br. of 
Appellees Part I); but if, for some reason, the state fails to provide 
adequate notice of a proceeding, thereby causing a water user's failure 
to protest, (R. 353-54), that water user will not be adversely 
affected or aggrieved by the State Engineer's decision, (Br. of 
Appellees Part II) . Such gainsaying should not eclipse the legislative 
recognition that the State Engineer's decisions can leave a person 
"aggrieved" and in need of an appeal. Utah Code Ann. §73-3-14(1)(a).4 
4
 Defendants' argument is severely flawed and disingenuous for 
other reasons. For example, Defendants assert that Mr. Longley's right 
to protest and subsequent cause of action to appeal a decision of the 
State Engineer are not within the bundle of protected property 
interests of a water user. (Br. of Appellees at 22.) Defendants 
argue, "Not just any cause of action is a protected property interest." 
"In order to be a protected property interest," they continue, "the 
cause of action must be the means by which a claim for a protected 
property interest is asserted or otherwise protected from deprivation." 
(Br. of Appellees at 22 (emphasis added).) And yet the entire premise 
of Part I of Defendants' response brief is that filing a protest before 
the State Engineer is the only means of legitimately preserving a cause 
of action to protect one's water rights. "By failing to file his 
protest with the State Engineer in a timely manner, Longley did not 
comply with the statutes and regulations governing administrative 
proceedings before the State Engineer. Participation in the 
administrative proceedings before the State Engineer is a condition 
precedent to seeking judicial review of the State Engineer's orders." 
(Br. of Appellees at 12 (emphasis added).) 
Thus Defendants represent in one breath that Mr. Longley should be 
denied standing because his failure to file a timely protest 
extinguished the only legitimate means he had to preserve his interests 
but in the other breath assert that Longley's right to protest and 
subsequent right of appeal are not within the bundle of 
constitutionally protected property interests of water users. This, 
despite their recognition that "the means by which a claim for a 
protected property interest is asserted or otherwise protected from 
deprivation," is constitutionally protected. (Br. of Appellees at 
22.) 
Of course, Defendants self-contradict even this point by 
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Finally, Defendants' argument that the right to protest is merely 
some sort of public relations or public input device, (Br. of Appellees 
at 26), means the State Engineer could arbitrarily strip individuals of 
the right to protest or disregard protests with impunity. The State 
Engineer could, under Defendants' reasoning, approve new applications 
that over-appropriate a stream or approve change applications that 
alter use from a 70% return flow to a 100% consumptive use without 
extending the right to protest to downstream or senior water users. 
The fact remains that the right to protest is the Utah 
legislature's recognition of the constitutional right to be heard. Just 
as the right to be heard is meaningless without first receiving proper 
notice; proper notice without a subsequent opportunity to be heard is 
also meaningless. "The constitutional right to be heard is a basic 
aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of 
decisionmaking . . . ." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972), 
reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (Oct. 10, 1972) . "The purpose of this 
requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. 
Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of 
property from arbitrary encroachment--to minimize substantively unfair 
or mistaken deprivations . . . ." Id. at 80-81. "There [is] no longer 
any doubt that the right to be heard . . . is . . . essential to due 
process." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51, n.8 (1987). This Court 
asserting that "Longley is not without a remedy to protect his water 
rights should the need arise,'' because Longley can bring a cause of 
action in district court "[i]f the actual diversion and use of water by 
a junior appropriator interferes with [his] water rights." (Br. of 
Appellees at 22 n.6.) However, "The claim of denial of due process of 
law is not foreclosed by the availability of either administrative or 
state remedial measures." Nelson v. Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist,, 
845 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (D.S.D. 1994). 
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must reject Defendants' spurious contention that Utah's water code is 
driven more by public relations concerns than constitutional concerns. 
To accept this would be to strip Utah's water code of any 
constitutional content. " [I]n this arid state, where a drop of water 
is a drop of gold," this would be a drastic mistake. Carbon Canal Co. 
v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n. 19 Utah 2d 6, 425 P.2d 407-08 (1967) . 
2. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the water 
rights of other persons are at risk or can be adversely 
affected by an extension request proceeding. 
Defendants rely heavily--as they must--on the 1944 case of 
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748 (1944) to buttress 
their overly broad and singular assertion that the State Engineer 
cannot conceivably affect any water rights in any proceeding. However, 
Whitmore is distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case was 
"aware of [the change application] but did not protest." Id. It is 
undisputed that Mr. Longley was not aware of Leucadia's application 
until after the time for taking protests had expired. (R. 354-55.) 
Furthermore, United States and Utah Supreme Court decisions in the past 
53 years have drastically undermined the validity of Whitmore's 
reasoning. For example, in United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 
1, 238 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1951) (hereinafter "District Court I"). reh'g 
denied, 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774 (1952) (hereinafter "District Court 
IX"), the Utah Supreme Court recognized: 
The administration of the waters of the western arid states 
present many vital and complicated problems. The right to the use 
of water, although a property right, is very different from the 
ownership of specific property which is subject to possession, 
control and use as the owner sees fit. Such right does not 
involve the ownership of a specific body of water but is only a 
right to use a given amount of the transitory waters of a stream 
or water source for a specified time, place and purpose, and a 
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change in any of these might materially affect the rights of other 
users of the same stream or source. 
* * • 
The State Engineer's decisions[] often have the effect of 
determining valuable rights.... His decisions require notice to 
all interested persons who may protest, whereupon the Engineer 
must investigate and hear evidence of all interested parties and 
he should approve or reject applications to appropriate, and 
applications for a change and issue or deny certificates that such 
applications have been accomplished in accordance with the law and 
the facts as he finds them. . . . Thus the decision of the 
Engineer . . . [has] the effect of establishing or denying 
valuable rights but such decisions, except where the issuance of 
a certificate of appropriation or change is involved do not 
purport to have the effect of adjudicating the right to the use of 
water . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus the Utah Supreme Court subsequently undermined its holding in 
Whitmore by recognizing that while the State Engineer does not 
adjudicate water rights, his decisions often have the practical 
consequence of affecting valuable rights.5 This recognition by the Utah 
5
 The Court recognized this distinction in a series of opinions 
shortly following Whitmore. In those cases, the Court distinctly 
recognized that approval of applications to change water can injure the 
vested rights of other users. See, e.g., District Court II, 242 P. 2d 
at 777 (recognizing adjudication/impairment distinction; Salt Lake City 
v. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n, 2 Utah 2d 141, 270 P.2d 453, 455 
(1954) (same; recognizing impairment of vested rights possible); East 
Bench Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 
449, 453-55 (1954) (same); East Bench Irrigation Co. v. State, 5 Utah 
2d 235, 300 P.2d 603, 607 (1956) (on appeal from engineer's decision, 
court "must adjudicate whether a foreseeable possible effect will 
constitute an impairment of vested rights"). That the result of a 
State Engineer proceeding on a change application may injure vested 
rights of other water users was recognized in Crafts v. Hansen. 667 
P.2d 1068 (Utah 1983), where the court reversed a summary judgment 
because there were disputed material issues of facts as to whether 
there was reasonable cause to believe other rights would not be 
impaired by approval. Id. at 1081. Justice Oaks dissented, citing 
Whitmore, and commented 
By reversing the district court and remanding this case for 
trial to resolve issues of fact on the existence of "reason to 
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Supreme Court, coupled with the United States Supreme Court's expansion 
of the core of interests considered "property" under the federal 
constitution in the 1970s,6 indicates that Whitmoref s rigidly 
formalistic and simplistic approach, which essentially required a water 
user to be stripped of his legal claim to water before being deemed to 
have suffered a deprivation of property, would not be sustainable under 
modern principles of due process. Risk of a real world deprivation of 
water--not a water right--is all that is required to state a claim for 
an unconstitutional deprivation.7 "If the state prevents you from 
entering your house it deprives you of your property right even if the 
fee simple remains securely yours. A property right is not bare title, 
but the right of exclusive use and enjoyment." Reed v. Village of 
Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). Accord 
Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 798 (holding tax sale 
believe,lf the majority effectively . . . telescopes an 
interlocutory administrative determination on a change application 
into a mini-adjudication of vested rights. Seen in a larger 
context, this is just one more instance where the law is being 
changed . . . . 
Id. at 1081 (citing Whitmore) and 1082 (Oaks, J., dissenting). 
6This expansion is well-documented. See, e.g. Laurence H. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law § 10-9, at 685 (1988) ("During the early 
1970's, the circle of interests sufficient to create 'liberty' or 
'property' for purposes of due process was significantly widened.") 
7Mr. Longley well understands that the Leucadia extension 
proceeding could not strip away the legal title to his water rights. 
That is not his concern. His concern is how the extension will affect 
his ability to divert his full entitlement of water. (R. 352-55.) Of 
course, as Defendants correctly point out, the only way for Mr. Longley 
to safeguard his rights is to protest the extension by showing the 
applicant failed to exercise diligence and failed to make a proper 
showing of reasonable cause for delay. (Br. of Appellees at 25.) 
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"diminishes the value of a [mortgagee's] security interest by granting 
the tax-sale purchaser a lien with priority" even though 
"nullification" of mortgagee's legal interest has not occurred). 
Likewise, if a decision of the State Engineer would have the practical 
effect of preventing a water user from receiving the quantity or 
quality of water to which he is entitled, he deprives that user of his 
property right even if the purely legal right to use water remains 
unadjudicated and, therefore, legally unaffected. 
Furthermore, since Whitmore, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized 
the drastic impact repeated extensions, such as Leucadia's Fifth 
Extension, can have on other water users. For example, in Carbon Canal 
Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n, 19 Utah 2d 6, 425 P.2d 405 (1967), 
the Court reversed a trial court's judgment granting an extension 
request to Sanpete Water Users Association. Sanpete, like Leucadia, 
had filed several extension requests, thereby extending the time to put 
its water to beneficial use and effectively "tying up" that amount of 
water "for over a quarter century," allegedly to the detriment of the 
protestant, Canal Co. The Court commented, 
"Sanpete's successful extensions for decades . . . impel this 
court . . . to canvass the facts to determine if, in this arid 
state, where a drop of water is a drop of gold, one, by extension 
after extension, may equitably prevent beneficial use of water by 
others through procedural stagnation for about forty years. We 
think not . . . ." Id. at 407-08. 
The Utah Supreme Court therefore not only expressly recognized that 
"extension after extension [] may . . . prevent beneficial use of water 
by others" but also recognized the inequity of such a situation and 
expressly disallowed it. Id.8 
8
 See also Blake v. Lambert, 590 P.2d 351, 352 (Utah 1979) ("Water, 
in an arid state like Utah, is its life-blood, measured in currency 
75837 L0589 001 12 
3. Defendants cannot demonstrate as a matter of law that 
the water rights of users from the same water source 
cannot conceivably be harmed by any decision of the 
State Engineer "under any scenario advanced." 
There are several scenarios under which approval of an extension 
application could drastically affect the water rights of others on the 
same source. For example, assume application A was made in 1957 for 25 
cfs when 100 cfs was flowing in a stream and available for 
appropriation. It is now 1997. Applications B, C, and D, in that 
order, were made in the intervening 4 0 years, giving B, C, and D each 
junior rights to 25 cfs in addition to A's senior right, thereby fully 
appropriating the 100 cfs flowing in the stream. However, since 1957 
stream flow has diminished to just 70 cfs and now, after 40 years of 
delay, A seeks another extension on his 25 cfs. If the extension is 
granted, A, being a senior, can in the future, under the prior 
appropriation doctrine in effect in Utah, use his entire 25 cfs, 
leaving 45 cfs in the stream for B, C, and D. B can still receive his 
25 cfs. But once A begins using the water, C has just been permanently 
deprived of 5 cfs and D has lost the practical ability to divert water 
altogether.9 On the other hand, had C and D protested A's extension 
represented by survival itself,—without a high degree of equitable 
justification for protracted extension."); See In re Determination of 
Relative Rights to Use of Waters of Deschutes River, 108 P.2d 276, 284 
(Ore. 1940) (Oregon Supreme Court retracted "statement [in a prior 
opinion] that the granting of an extension of time . . . within which 
to complete the application of water to a beneficial use could not in 
any way affect the adjudicated rights of other claimants"). 
9
 It is therefore shortsighted and overly simplistic for Defendants 
to maintain "when the State Engineer approves an extension request, all 
other water rights continue as originally approved; the same quantity 
of water may be diverted under the same priority date, from the same 
point of diversion, at the same place of use, and for the same nature 
of use. . . . They are not adversely affected in any way." (Br. of 
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application and demonstrated Afs lack of diligence lapse and C and D 
would suffer no deprivation.10 
Assuming the same facts as above, assume further that A's last 
extension request was denied and no action was taken by the State 
Engineer upon a request for rehearing, thereby deeming the application 
lapsed. Relying on the public records, which reflected that the 
application for extension had lapsed, C and D prudently invest hundreds 
of thousands of dollars to improve their respective diversion and 
distribution facilities and change their farming methods, relying on 
the fact that they would now be able to utilize their water rights to 
the fullest extent possible.11 Thinking that A is now out of the 
picture, and that C can divert his full 25 cfs and D can divert the 
remaining 20 cfs in the stream, D now learns that A's extension request 
had been unlawfully reinstated after a hearing preceded by defective 
public notice. A now has the right to put 25 cfs to beneficial use 
Appellees at 18.) While it is true that the paper rights of C and D 
are not adversely impacted in any way, C and D' s real world ability of 
use and enjoyment has been emasculated. 
10
 The scenario of an intervening drought or other changes in the 
water supply over the course of many years is not mere conjecture in an 
arid state like Utah. It is, perhaps, for this reason that section 73-
3-12 allows the State Engineer to approve extensions without notice or 
right to protest within 14 years of application but requires notice and 
the right to protest for extensions beyond that date. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-3-12(1)(d) (1989). There is a significant likelihood that a 
water supply has changed 14 years after an application was filed. 
11
 Of course, C and D realize that upon denial of A's application 
the waters which A would have been entitled to theoretically revert to 
the state. But, being two of only three appropriators, each with 
rights to 25 cfs, on a stream that is now over appropriated (70 cfs of 
water available but 75 cfs in approved applications) C and D realize 
that there is no more water left for appropriation to citizens of the 
state and that the waters of the stream, as a practical matter, are 
theirs for appropriation. And even if the State Engineer approved more 
rights on the same source those rights would be junior to C and D's. 
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and, should A do so, Dfs farming operation and investments incident 
thereto are irretrievably lost. As illustrated, Defendants' assertion 
that a decision of the State Engineer cannot affect other water users' 
water rights "under any scenario advanced" is false. 
C. Mr. Longley's Water Rights Were Adversely Affected by the 
State Engineer's Illegal Approval of Leucadia's Unlawful and 
Untimely Extension Request. 
A water source has a fixed capacity, like seating in a theater. 
And water users, like anxious theater goers, line up for the right to 
enjoy a share of the fixed resource. One's place in line determines 
the extent to which he or she may enjoy the resource. He who is "first 
in time is first in right" and therefore enjoys the superior right. 
District Court I. 238 P.2d at 1136. Of course, with a limited number 
of seats available for a one-time-only performance, no one could 
seriously doubt the injury that other theater goers might suffer by 
allowing one who has been rightfully removed from the line to cut back 
in ahead of others. This is particularly true of theater goers who 
were theretofore behind the cutter and when the rules of the theater 
state that a theater goer must go to the very back of the line if he 
has not followed theater rules. Likewise, "in this arid state, where 
a drop of water is a drop of gold," Carbon Canal Co. 425 P.2d at 407-
08, and priority is the essence of a water right, District Court I, 238 
P. 2d at 113 6, no court should seriously doubt the injury that other 
water users might suffer by allowing one who has been rightfully 
removed from the line to cut back in. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 
462 U.S. at 798 (holding tax sale deprived mortgagee of 
constitutionally protected property interest because the sale 
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"diminishe[d] the value of [mortgagee's] security interest by granting 
the tax-sale purchaser a lien with priority"). 
A junior water user is also analogous to a junior mortgagee. Both 
have rights in a limited resource--a home or a water source--but do not 
have legal title to the resource. Both have rights that are junior or 
inferior to rights of those whose rights are prior in time. Therefore, 
both run the risk of being deprived of the practical realization of 
their "paper" rights.12 For this reason, courts have held that a junior 
mortgagee is entitled to due process protections. See Island 
Financial, Inc. v. Ballman, 607 A.2d 76, 79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) 
(a junior mortgagee, which did not receive notice of a senior's 
foreclosure, was entitled to actual notice because "ratification of 
the foreclosure sale has the ultimate effect of nullifying [its] 
interest in the property" even though a surplus of $321.33 existed 
after foreclosure of the first trust deed). 
A junior mortgagee, who had supplanted a senior mortgagee when the 
senior's interest had terminated by operation of law, would obviously 
12
 For example, if a water source was limited to 120 cfs at the 
time the junior water user acquired his water right for 20 cfs, subject 
to the 100 cfs right of a prior appropriator, but the water source is 
reduced to 100 cfs, the junior water user obtains no water though his 
paper right remains in tact. Likewise, if a home was worth $120,000.00 
at the time the junior mortgagee acquired his $20,000.00 interest 
subject to the $100,000.00 interest of the prior mortgagee, but is only 
worth $100,000.00 at the time of foreclosure, the junior mortgagee 
obtains nothing from the foreclosure proceeds even though his paper 
rights are not taken from him. Given the sensitive nature of the 
junior mortgagee and water user's rights, each would have a vested 
interest in receiving notice of any proceeding that might affect the 
rights of the senior. If the rights of the senior are somehow 
eliminated or lapsed, the right of the junior is obviously a much more 
valuable right as a result. On the other hand, even if the senior 
rights are not somehow eliminated, any assertion by the senior of those 
rights has a drastic real world impact on the rights of the junior. 
75837 L0589 001 16 
be adversely affected or deprived of a valuable interest in proceedings 
wherein the senior asserted that his interest was not actually 
extinguished and should remain intact. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 
462 U.S. at 798 (deprivation of priority without notice is 
unconstitutional). This is the essence of Mr. Longley's complaint, 
wherein it is alleged that Leucadia was rightfully removed from line 
but was allowed to cut back in through the illegal action of the State 
Engineer, (R. 160-67).13 Leucadia's water rights lapsed as a matter of 
law when it failed to submit verified proof of appropriation on or 
before November 30, 1989. (R. 42-47, 163, 331.) The State Engineer 
had no authority or power to resurrect Leucadia's water right by a 
purported Fifth Extension Request filed on September 21, 1990, a full 
ten months after Leucadia's water rights lapsed as a matter of law. 
(R. 52, 58-59, 163-65.) In Baugh v. Criddle. 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 
790 (1967), a water user's predecessor had, like Leucadia, been granted 
l 
an extension request under a similar statute and, like Leucadia, on the 
eve of the extension deadline submitted unverified proof of 
appropriation. Id. at 791. The Utah Supreme Court held that the water 
right had lapsed under Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 when verified proof was 
not submitted by the deadline. Id. The Court held that the statute 
mandated that the application lapse and that the State Engineer lacked 
authority to alter this result. Id. 
13
 Thus, Defendants' assertion that "When the State Engineer 
decides that due diligence or reasonable cause for delay has not been 
shown and that an application must lapse, the State Engineer's decision 
may indirectly benefit other appropriators. . . . [but] does not 
adversely affect their water rights," (Br. of Appellee's at 18), 
severely misses the point by completely ignoring the facts of this 
case. 
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The Court further held that statutory provisions like section 73-
1-4 and 73-3-12 "should be strictly construed," id. (quoting Kinney, 
Irrigation and Water Rights, 2d ed., 1912, Vol. 2, § 1120), because 
"[i]n this arid state, where water is the heartbeat of our economy, 
more and more it becomes quite obvious that development of water must 
require strict adherence to statutory sanctions, without delay or non-
conformance thereto,--lest our whole economy lag to the detriment of 
our future," Id. The principles of Baugh, which dealt with the 
forfeiture of water rights that had been proved up, demonstrate that 
under section 73-3-12 failure to submit proof that water has been put 
to beneficial use by the stipulated deadline for doing so lapses the 
application by operation of law and, consequently, automatically 
deprives the applicant of any right to water. Therefore, when Leucadia 
failed to submit verified proof by the appropriate deadline, (R. 42-47, 
163) , its water application lapsed by operation of law and the State 
Engineer had no authority to resurrect that right as he did in this 
case.14 The unlawful actions of both Leucadia and the State Engineer to 
14
 Even if he did have such authority and the right was 
resurrected after its November 30, 1989 death, (R. 42-47, 163), 
Leucadia's right suffered a second death because the State Engineer 
took no action on Leucadia's request for reconsideration on or before 
August 19, 1992, a date 20 days from the time Leucadia's request for 
reconsideration was received, (R. 52, 164). See Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-13(3)(b) (emphasis added) ("If the agency . . . does not issue an 
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for 
reconsideration shall be considered to be denied.") Defendants 
mislead the Court with their representation that both the Utah 
Supreme Court and this Court have held that "state agencies may act 
on requests for reconsideration beyond the 20-day period." (Br. of 
Appellees at 28 n.12.) Neither Harper Inv., Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 
868 P.2d 813, 815-16 (Utah 1994) nor 49th Street Galleria v. Tax 
Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied 878 P.2d 
1154 (Utah 1994), can be read so broadly. Instead, both cases dealt 
with proper tolling of the 30-day appeal period and held that the 30-
day period is not triggered until the latter of the following: (1) 
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resurrect that right effectively allowed Leucadia to cut back in line 
when other water users, like Mr. Longley, had already, by operation of 
law, moved ahead. Accordingly, under the peculiar facts of this case, 
Mr. Longley could have been injured by Leucadia's and the State 
Engineer's unlawful action. (R. 159, 172, 353-55, 562, 564-65, 567.) 
II. THE PUBLISHED NOTICE OF LEUCADIA'S EXTENSION REQUEST WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY INADEQUATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFECTIVE ON 
ITS FACE, AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW. 
A. Notice by Publication Was Constitutionally Inadequate Under 
the Circumstances and Constitutionally Defective On Its Face. 
This Court must start with the premise that notice by publication 
is generally disfavored and that Defendants' "justification" of this 
method "is difficult at best," New York v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 
344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953), particularly under the facts and 
circumstances of this case.15 
Defendants1 sole justification for eclipsing Mr. Longley's 
constitutional rights--that because the State Engineer administers 
the date on which an order or denial was issued or (2) the date on 
which an order was deemed to have been denied. See Harper, 868 P.2d 
at 815-16. "[I]f an agency chooses to issue an order denying a 
petition for reconsideration after the twenty-day presumptive denial 
period, the actual date of issuance would mark the beginning of the 
thirty-day time period." Id. at 816 (emphasis added). Neither case 
holds that the agency may approve a petition for reconsideration 
after the twenty-day presumptive denial period. 
15
 Nothing in the Utah Supreme Court's recent opinion in V-l Oil 
Company v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997) 
alters the constitutional analysis this Court should utilize. The 
proper constitutional standards are clearly set forth in Part I.B. of 
Mr. Longley's initial brief and are incorporated herein by this 
reference. The V-l Oil court simply recognized the Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), balancing approach adopted more 
than 20 years ago by the United States Supreme Court and discussed at 
page 20 of Mr. Longley's initial brief. 
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approximately 120,000 water rights individual notice to water users 
would be "overwhelmingly burdensome" (Br. of Appellees at 29)--is a 
misleading red herring that must be rejected for a number of reasons. 
First, water users often own more than one right from the same source 
of supply. For example, a single water user may hold 50 water rights. 
Therefore, notice to water rights holders is all that would be required 
and would be much less burdensome than Defendants suggest. Second, the 
State Engineer would not be required to give actual notice to all water 
users in the state any time he took action. Instead, actual notice 
would be given only to those who: (1) request it; (2) provide 
information making their whereabouts and identity reasonably 
ascertainable; and (3) could be affected adversely by his decision 
(e.g., only those who hold water rights in the same source of supply). 
The number of persons conforming to these criteria would be a mere 
fraction of 120,000. 
Third, Defendants cannot dispute that other agencies in this state 
provide notice of their proceedings to all who request it. (See Br. of 
Appellant at 26 & n.13.) Fourth, they cannot dispute that states much 
more populous than Utah are reguired to provide notice of 
administrative proceedings to all who request it. (See Br. of 
Appellant at 25-26.) Fifth, and finally, Defendants cannot dispute 
that Mr. Longley's name and address were reasonably ascertainable, and 
that he--and only he--requested actual notice of this particular 
application. (Br. of Appellees at 7; R. 330-31, 353-54, 365, 515, 530, 
556-57, 562-63, 565-67.)16 
16
 The State Engineer maintains a file on each water right. Mr. 
Longley's request for actual notice was placed in the file for 
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Therefore, Defendants cannot dispute the conclusion that the cost 
of one sheet of paper, one envelope, and one stamp, should not outweigh 
Mr. Longley's constitutional right to receive adequate notice.17 There 
is no risk of destabilizing water rights in this State by requiring 
that actual notice be given to those water users from the same source 
of supply who request it, as Defendants' spuriously contend. (Br. of 
Appellees at 29-30.) This system of providing actual notice has not 
destabilized the water rights in Colorado or Nebraska. See Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 37-92-302 (3) (b) , and (c) (1990) (requiring that state give 
notice of changes or applications affecting water rights to those it 
"has reason to believe would be affected or who [have] requested the 
same by submitting his name and address to the water clerk")/ Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 46-238(2) (1996) (requiring notice of an extension request to 
be given to "any person who requests notification of the [extension] 
hearing"). It has not destabilized the numerous other Utah agencies 
who follow such a policy. (See Br. of Appellant at 26 & n.13.) The 
essence of Defendants' objection to an actual notice requirement is 
this: "If such a duty were found to exist by reason of due process . 
. . . [s]uch a task is . . . contrary to the reasonable procedures 
outlined by the Legislature." (Br. of Appellees at 29.) However, when 
legislated administrative convenience inadequately safeguards sacred 
constitutional protections, the legislation must yield. 
Leucadia's water right. There is no burden on the State Engineer to 
give actual notice to those persons who have a request for such notice 
placed in the file of a particular water right. 
17
 The State Engineer could also charge an administrative fee to 
those desiring such notice. 
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Moreover, as demonstrated in Part I above, Leucadia's failure to 
file verified proof by November 30, 1989, (R. 42-47, 163) or the State 
Engineer's July 10, 1992 Memorandum Decision lapsing the Change 
Application, (R. 49-50), and the automatic denial of the Request for 
Reconsideration of that decision, (R. 164), dissolved Leucadia's water 
right by operation of law and sent notice to all water users from the 
same source of supply that Leucadia had been bumped out of line and 
stripped of its priority date. Baugh, 431 P.2d at 791-92. The 
Defendants' subsequent attempts to resurrect this lapsed right were 
unlawful. But, even assuming the lawfulness of these attempts, 
Defendants were constitutionally required to take more drastic steps to 
notify interested persons of this unusual action, particularly in the 
event that water users had detrimentally relied on the State Engineer's 
decisions lapsing Leucadia's right. (See Br. of Appellant at 23-24.) 
Finally, for the reasons explained in Part II.B. below, which is 
incorporated herein by this reference, the published notice itself was 
constitutionally defective on its face. Therefore, even if this Court 
were to conclude that Mr. Longley was not entitled to actual notice 
under the circumstances, it would still need to reverse the trial 
court's decision because the published notice itself was not reasonably 
calculated to inform interested parties of the pending state action. 
B, Although Strict Compliance is Required, The April 1994 Notice 
Does Not Even Substantially Comply with Statutory Notice 
Requirements• 
Under this Court's holding in Badger v. Madsen. 896 P.2d 20, 23 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 
1995) , strict compliance is required even if the failure to adhere to 
notice requirements could just "possibly prejudice" that person. And 
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this Court also held in W&G Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 
761 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added) that "the potential to harm 
individual property rights" necessitated strict compliance. Since Mr. 
Longley is more than possibly or potentially affected by an illegal 
extension request, strict compliance is required. Id.18 
2. The property descriptions in the published notice were 
statutorily defective and inadequate. 
Even if Mr. Longley studiously perused the pages of The Chicago 
Manual of Style or the New York Public Library Writer's Guide to Style 
and Usage he still would not have been able to understand the cryptic 
April 1994 notice. Defendants' maintain that the April 1994 notice 
listed the well sites "in the form of a sentence that used punctuation 
very purposefully."19 Defendants' "sentence"20 is nothing of the sort. 
18
 The case of Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth.. 618 P.2d 480, 482-83 
(Utah 1980), cited by Defendants, (Br. of Appellees at 42), is 
inapposite because it involved a notice of claim statute whereby a 
plaintiff's claim for personal injury was threatened to be extinguished 
for not presenting notice of his claim to the proper authority in 
precisely the prescribed manner. Conversely, in the case at bar, the 
Defendants—not the plaintiff—had a statutory charge to provide notice 
so Plaintiff could safeguard his rights and not forfeit his cause of 
action to defend those rights. Stahl is simply irrelevant and animated 
by different policy concerns. 
The quoted excerpt, (Br. of Appellees at 42), from Defendants' 
only other cited authority, Felida Neighborhood Assoc, v. Clark County, 
913 P.2d 823, 826 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), review denied, 922 P.2d 98 
(Wash. 1996), actually supports Mr. Longley's position. "Failure to 
satisfy the notice requirements . . . is excused where substantial 
compliance resulted in full and adequate notice." Id. (emphasis 
added). It is undisputed that the April 1994 notice did not result in 
notice to Mr. Longley, (R. 354-55), therefore the notice did not even 
substantially comply with statutory requirements 
19
 Defendants assert: 
In his brief, Longley lists the proposed new points of 
diversion in a form that is misleading. (See Br. of 
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The first of these "important and sometimes multiple purposes" was 
"to separate the references to the individual wells, which are 
indicated by serial numbers enclosed within parentheses. This,"21 
declare the Defendants, "is a very common style of usage." Id. 
Appellant at 9, 29 n.16.) The points of diversion as 
published were not listed in a table, they were listed in the 
form of a sentence that used punctuation very purposefully. 
Longley's tabular listing misleadingly isolates the courses 
and distances for the individual diversion points and de-
emphasizes the punctuation used. While tabular listing is 
convenient for comparison purposes, Longley's tabular listing 
is inaccurate because it distorts the actual published 
notice. 
(Br. of Appellees at 38 n.16.) 
In the interests of credibility, Mr. Longley would like to point 
out that Defendants' statement "The points of diversion as published 
were not listed in a table, they were listed in the form of a sentence 
that used punctuation very purposefully" should have a semicolon in it 
rather than a comma. See, e.g.. The Chicago Manual of Style § 5.8 9 at 
181 (14th ed. 1993). 
Also, Defendants' argument about Mr. Longley's vertical 
presentation of the list being misleading is specious. It is not a 
"table" at all. See, e.g., id. chap. 12 "Tables." It is a series 
(also called an enumeration), presentable in either "run-in" style (as 
in the 1994 notice) or "list" style (as in Mr. Longley's brief). See 
id. at §§ 5.57-5.61 & 8.75-8.77. The differences are-at least, they 
are supposed to be—purely stylistic; it's not supposed to make any 
difference which way the series is presented, and either way is 
correct. See id. at §§ 5.61 & 8.76. The 1994 notice ought to be 
intelligible in either form. 
20
 It runs as follows: 
POD: Same as Heretofore, but adding the following 16 in. 
wells 0 to 800 ft. deep: (1) S 50 E 2531, (2) S 2343 E 253 
from NW Cor, Sec 25, (3) S 50 E 50 from NW Cor, (4) S 50 W 
66, (5) S 2343 W 50 from NE Cor, (6) S 2343 E 2970 from NW 
Cor, Sec 26, T42S, R14W. 
21
 This, in this sentence, has multiple (and therefore ambiguous) 
antecedents: separation by commas, "serial" numbers (i.e., numbers in 
a series), and parentheses around such numbers. Page 173 of the 
Chicago Manual, however, to which Defendants cite, discusses only 
separation by commas. 
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Defendants cite to page 173 of The Chicago Manual of Style (14th ed. 
1993) (the "Chicago Manual") for support; page 173, however, covers 
only general comma usage. The correct citation is § 8.75 on page 313: 
Enumerations that are run into the text may be indicated by 
numerals or italic letters in parentheses. In a simple series 
with little or no punctuation within each item, separation by 
commas is sufficient. Otherwise, semicolons are used. 
(emphasis added); See also id. at §§ 5.59 & 5.94 ("when items in a 
series . . . involve internal punctuation, they should be separated by 
semicolons for the sake of clarity"). Thus, not only should there be a 
semicolon between "Sec 25" and "(3)," for Defendants' interpretation to 
make any sense at all, the rules of punctuation would require one. 
Commas were also used, assert Defendants, "to indicate the 
omission of words that are understood by the context of the sentence" 
(Br. of Appellees at 38 (citing Chicago Manual at 176)), and "to 
separate elements that grammatically belonged to two or more wells, but 
were expressed only after the last well" (Br. of Appellees at 39 
(paraphrasing New York Public Library Writer's Guide to Style and 
Usage 255 (1994) (the "New York Guide"))). What the New York Guide 
actually says, however, is this: 
A comma is placed before an element that grammatically 
belongs to two or more phrases but is expressed only after 
the last one. 
New York Guide at 255 (emphasis added). Defendants' well descriptions 
are not grammatical phrases. They are adverbials of place, designating 
the locations of six "16 in. wells 0 to 800 ft. deep." Their structure 
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is entirely distinct from the New York Guide's "4-day work week" 
example cited by Defendants.22 
An example structurally identical to the 1994 notice will 
demonstrate the inadequacy of Defendants' grammatical position. 
Suppose you send a runner for a number of books, then modify the list, 
sending the new list after him: 
Same books as on the previous list, but adding the following: 
(1) third from the left, (2) tenth from the left on the top 
shelf, first bookcase, (3) seventh from the left on the top 
shelf, (4) second from the left, (5) fifth from the left on 
the third shelf, (6) eighth from the left on the top shelf, 
second bookcase, over on the east wall of the University of 
Utah law library. 
The descriptions of books 1 and 4, of course, are hopeless: your runner 
is standing in the middle of a library, surrounded by books which can 
be identified as "second from the left" or "third from the left." 
Assuming, however, that he somehow surmounts this obstacle, should he 
assume, as Defendants argue, that book 1 is on the top shelf of the 
first bookcase? Why? Because the description of book 2 mentions a 
"first bookcase"? A proper list, of course, would state somehow that 
both books 1 and 2 came from the first bookcase --by repeating it in 
each description, or by putting "first bookcase" as a heading. 
22
 See Appendix A The description (repeated here for convenience) 
POD: Same as Heretofore, but adding the following 16 in. wells 0 
to 800 ft. deep: (1) S 50 E 2531, (2) S 2343 E 253 from NW Cor, 
Sec 25, (3) S 50 E 50 from NW Cor, (4) S 50 W 66, (5) S 2343 W 50 
from NE Cor, (6) S 2343 E 2970 from NW Cor, Sec 26, T42S, R14W. 
contains neither subject nor predicate; indeed, the only verb in the 
entire provision is the gerund "adding," and the only nouns are "wells" 
and the unstated "point" in POD. Of course, neither noun is the 
subject of any sentence. There is no sentence— just a brief 
appositive, "same as heretofore," and a lengthy gerund 
phrase—comprising the rest of the description—the object of which is 
"wells"; the rest is adverbial locatives. 
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From Defendants' argument, one must infer that the "top shelf" in 
the description of book 3 refers to the top shelf of the second 
bookcase, referenced in the description of book 6; but why doesn't it 
mean the top shelf of the first bookcase, as in book 2's description? 
There is no good reason to group book 3 with book 6; there isn't even 
a semicolon between book 2 and book 3 to indicate that they don't go 
together, or that different groupings exist. In fact, there is no 
reason even to suspect that any of the books except book 6 are located 
on any but the first bookcase since only book 6's description says 
anything about it. Nor does any of the descriptions (again excepting 
book 6's) say anything about the east wall of the library. 
The vagueness of this addendum to the earlier list makes it 
practically useless: no one could correctly locate these books without 
extraordinary luck; the data given are simply insufficient. These 
objections apply with equal validity to the structure of the 1994 
notice: 
POD: Same as Heretofore, but adding the following 16 in. 
wells 0 to 800 ft. deep: (1) S 50 E 2531, (2) S 2343 E 253 
from NW Cor, Sec 25, (3) S 50 E 50 from NW Cor, (4) S 50 W 
66, (5) S 2343 W 50 from NE Cor, (6) S 2343 E 2970 from NW 
Cor, Sec 26, T42S, R14W. 
As with our book example, descriptions 1 and 4 are hopeless: we have no 
idea where to measure them from; Defendants' reassurance that the 
necessary information can be found tacked on at the end, as we have 
seen, is neither grammatically sound nor rhetorically sensible. 
Why should anyone assume that well 1 is to be measured from the 
northwest corner of section 25? And since well 3 clearly states "from 
NW Cor," can it not be reasonably assumed that the northwest corner of 
section 25 is meant, as in the description of well 2? There is nothing 
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to stop us inferring that well 5 is in the northeast corner of section 
25, nor any good reason to conclude that any well except number 6 is in 
section 26 at all. Moreover, the fact that well 6 appears to be in 
township 42 south of range 14 west says nothing whatever about the 
locations of wells 1 through 5. The import of the reader being able to 
determine the location of the wells is obvious. A well 500 feet from 
your water source is of much greater concern than one five miles away. 
It is curious that the State Engineer employed this awkward, ambiguous, 
and confusing format, especially in light of the fact that such notice 
has in the past been quite clear.23 However, because he has done so, 
the notice is defective and fails to comport with minimum requirements 
of due process and section 73-3-12. See W&G, 802 P.2d at 762. 
2. The published notice did not inform the public of the 
diligence claimed or the reason for the request. 
The published notice did not "inform the public of the diligence 
claimed," as required by Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(1) (e) (ii), for those 
reasons set forth in Part II.B.l of Mr. Longley's initial brief. It 
also did not "inform the public of . . . the reason for the request," 
23
 Note, for instance, the February 1, 1971, notice on these same 
wells (numbered differently): 
Hereafter, 6.027 sec.-ft. of water is to be diverted from 
each or all of 8 16-in. wells, 0-800 ft. deep as follows: . 
. . (S) [sic] 49.5 ft. E. 49.5 ft. from NW Cor. § 26; (4) S. 
49.5 ft. W. 66 ft. from NE Cor. § 26; (5) S. 49.5 ft. E. 2531 
ft. from NW Cor. § 25; (6) S. 2343 ft. E. 253 ft. from NW 
Cor. § 25; (7) S. 2343 ft. W. 49.5 ft. from NE Cor. § 26; (8) 
S. 2343 ft. E. 2970 ft. NW Cor. § 26; all T42S, R14W. 
Washington County News, St. George, Utah, Feb. 1, 1971 (Appendix B). 
Here it appears that the State Engineer (Hubert C. Lambert at that 
time) had no problem understanding and properly using semicolons; nor 
clearly stating the corner and section for each well; nor plainly 
declaring that all of them were in township 42 south, range 14 west. 
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id., and Defendants' assertion to the contrary is absurd. Defendants 
argue "the published notice stated that the reason for the request was 
"that additional time [was] needed to place the water to beneficial 
use. '" (Br. of Appellee's at 37.) In other words, "we need an 
extension because we need an extension," Defendants assert, satisfies 
the statutory requirement that notice of an extension request must 
"inform the public of . . . the reason for the [extension] request." 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (1) (e) (ii) (emphasis added). This absurdity 
violates nearly every canon of statutory construction and must be 
rejected.24 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
24
 Defendants' argument would suffice if the notice statute said, 
"The notice shall contain information that will inform the public of . 
. . the . . . request." However, the statute says, "The notice shall 
contain information that will inform the public of . . . the reason for 
the request." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (1) (e) (ii) (emphasis added). 
Defendants' proffered interpretation requires this court to ignore some 
of the statutory language. However, "In the process of interpretation, 
courts may not take, strike, or read anything out of a statute or 
delete, subtract, or omit anything therefrom." W&G, 802 P.2d at 769 
(citations omitted). See also, e.g., Carlie, 922 P.2d at 4 (statutory 
provisions should be presumed to have been used advisedly)/ Beaver 
County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 1996) (primary 
rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve); 
Hunt, 906 P.2d at 312 (interpretation that renders parts of a statute 
superfluous is to be avoided). 
75837 LO589.001 29 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the grant of summary judgment by 
the district court must be reversed and this matter remanded for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this [ u day of December, 1997. 
emit 
irtvigsen 
.lsworth 
'McDonald 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX "A" 
We approve of, and are willing to participate in, the new 
4-day work week. 
prove 
.fate. 
POD; Same as Heretofore, but adding the following 
16 in. wells 0 to 800 ft. deep: (1) S 50 E 2531, 
(2) S 2343 E 253 
from NW Cor, (4) 
NE Cor, (6) 2343 
R14W. 
from NW Cor, Sec 25, (3) S 50 E 50 
S 50 W 66, (5) S 2343 W 50 from 
E 2970 from NW Cor, Sec 26, T42S, 
CO 
6p*MCyft 
NcJCor- S*c ZL 
\ 
TWZS RN U ) 
APPENDIX "B" 
MOTfCE TO WATER USERS 
I ic following applications 
we been filed with the State 
»£»incer to change water in, 
ishtngton County, State of 
ah, throughout the entire year 
•less other designated. Loca-
ns in SLB&M. 
a-639l lerracor, 529 E. South 
Mnple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
ioposes to change the poinT of 
version, place and nature of 
.c» of 2.0 sec.-ft. of watqr as 
idenced by App. 33926- (81-
»
CJ). The water was to have 
en diverted from a 16-In. well, 
Kl-500 ft. deep at a point N. 
>1() ft. W. 1320 ft. from Si' 
->r. Sec. 16, T42S, R13VV, and 
ed from Ma/ 1 to Dec. 30 f.n 
ockwatering of 50 cattle and 
om May 1 to Oct. 1 for ini-
ition of 170 acres within WJ4-
:l/4, NV5SE%sw%. SEV4NW* 
.SfcSWV4NWV4. Ni/2NViNW. 
SW% Sec 16, T42S, R13W. 
Hereafter, 2.0 sec.-ft. of water 
to be diverted from each or 
of 7 16- in. wells, 0-800 ft 
ep as follows: (1) Same as 
retofor, (2) S. 49.5 ft E. 49.5 
from NW Cor. Sec. 26; (3) 
49.5 ft. W. 66 ft. from NE 
>r. Sec. 26; (4) S. 49.5 ft E. 
31 ft. from NW Cor. Sec. 25; 
) S. 2343 ft. E. 253 ft. from 
V Cor. Sec. 25; (6) S. 2343 
W. 49.5 ft. from NE Cor. 
c. 26; (7) S. 2343 ft. E. 2970 
from NW Cor. Sec. 26, all 
2S, R14W; and Used as here-
or in addition to misc. uses 
* domestic recreation and in-
stria! purposes within Sees. 5-
143S, R15W, and Sees. 11-15,* 
& 23, T43S, R16W. 
1-6392 Terracor, 529 E. South 
mple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
>poses to change the point of 
ersion, place and nature of 
* of 3.0 sec.-ft. of water as 
denced by App. No. 35439 
-579). The water was to have 
n^ diverted from a 16-ln. well, 
1-200 ft. deep at a point S. 
1 ft. E. 1184 ft. from WV4 
r. Sec. 9, T43S, R15W, and 
* red from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31 
means of an earth-filled dam 
ft. high creating a reservoir 
'ing an 8 ac.-ft. capacity in-
iaitng I acre; and used for 
ckwatering of 200 cattle, sup-
mental irrigation of 300 acres 
'bin EV? Sec. 8, and W*/2 Sec. 
T43S, R15W. I 
lereafter, 3.0 sec.-ft. of water 
I be diverted from 2 wells \ 
follows: (I) Same as hereto-
(2) 16-in. well, 0-800 ft.1 
-p at a point N. 750 ft. W.
 x 
)0 ft. from EV4 Cor. Sec. 12,' 
IS, R16W and stored as here-' 
or and used as heretofor de-
ihod in addition to misc. uses 
municipal domestic, rccrea-
i and industrial purposes, 
Inn S'V > \ M »S. Rl r i \V :tn<l 
STATE DF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT DF NATURAL RESOURCES 
D I V I S I D N DF WATER RIGHTS 
442 STATE C A P I T O L 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84114 
February L, 1971 
RE: CHANGE APPLICATION NO. a-6393 
NOTICE TO WATER USE RS PUBLISHED IN: 
Washington County News, St. George, Utah on 
December 17, 24 & 31, 1970. 
PROTEST PERIOD ENDED: January 30, 1971 
PROTESTED 
HUBERT C LAMBERT 
STATE ENGINEER 
TELEPHONE 
328-5671 
>1Tft-fcTO JleTracor. E&STfe. South 
TempleTSaSlt Lake City, Utah, 
proposcV to .change '< the point 
df diverslonf*pjace and nature of 
use of 6ffp7f4.Sc.-ft. of water as 
'evidenced by» App, No. 36856 
(81-669) &>36857 (81-670). The 
water has Been diverted from 2 
wells as'follows: (1) 16-in. well, 
55 ft. deep, located N. 1491 ft 
E. 155 ft. from.WVi Cor. Sec. 
23; (2) 8-ln. well, 45 ft deep, 
located S. 100 ft W. 1100 ft 
from Ei/4 Cdn Sec. 22; all T43S, 
R16W; and stored from Jan. 1 
to Dec. 31 by means of an earth-
filled j^iarn 10 ft high, creating a, 
reservoir having a 10; ac-ft ca-
pacity inundating 2 acres; and* 
used as* follows: (1) domestic 
purposes of 4 families, stock-
.watering of:200 cattle; (2) do-
mestic purposes of 1 family, 
sfockwatering- of 50 swine, 10. 
horses* 50 cattleY and 100 poul-; 
try; and from >Maiv 1 to Nov. 
30 for supplemental-irrigation of 
400 acres but limited t6 a sole* 
supply on 350 acres%within E*4 
Sec. 22, NY2r SWVi' Sec. 23, 
T43S, R16W. . ^ j t" ; 
Hereafter, 6.027 Wc.-ft/of wa-
ter is to be diverted'from each 
or all of 8 16-inV wells, 0-800 
ft. deep as follows: "<1 & 2) same 
as heretofor, (S) 49.5 ft. E. 49 5 
ft. from NW Cor. Sec. 26; (4) 
S. 49.5 ft. W. 66 ft. from NE 
Cor. Sec. 26; (5) S. 49.5 ft. E. 
2531 ft from NW Cor. Sec. 25, 
(6) S. 2343 ft. E, 253 ft from 
NW Cor. Sec. 25; (7) S. 2343 
ft. W. 49.5 ft from NE Cor. 
See. 26; (8) S. 2343 ft E. 2970 
ft. NW.Cor. SecV 26;. all T42S, 
R14W; and stored as heretofor, 
and used for domestic purposes, 
of 5 families, stockwatering of 
250 cattle, 10 horses,.50 swine/ 
and 100 poultry, in 'addition to 
domestic, recreation and indus-
trial uses and from Mar. 1 to 
Nov. 30 for supplemental irri-
gation of 400 acres but limited 
to a sole supply of 350 acres 
within Sees. 5-8, T43S, R15W, 
and Sees. 11-15, 22 & 23, T43S,' 
R16W. 
Protests resisting the granting 
of these applications with rea-, 
sons therefor must be filed in" 
duplicate with the State Engi-
neer,, 442 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake ."City, Utah 84114, on or 
before January 31, 1971. 
Hubert C. Lambert 
STATE ENGINEER 
Published in the Washington 
County News on December 17, 
24, and 31, 1970. 
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